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Introduction

Over the last several years there has been a significant debate about the
ethics of making active voluntary euthanasia and physician-assisted
suicide available for terminally ill patients, including arguments for their
moral adequacy. There is an increasing tendency to write in favor of
accepting the morality of euthanasia in an effort to fit into public
consensus. By "physician-assisted suicide" it is meant that the physician
provides the means for a patient to end his or her life. By "active
euthanasia" it is meant that the physician personally administers a lethal
drug. Death will be caused to end a life of suffering, either because the
patient does not want to continue living or because life has deteriorated to
such a condition that it no longer can be considered dignified.
Advancements in medicine have led to examination of the obligation
to consider the use of all possible means of keeping a person ali ve, or if we
are to do this when there is little chance of success. The issue has arisen of
the question of a right to die with di gnity.
For some, this means to die without pain, through medical
intervention or assisted suicide. Any death that is accompanied by
suffering is considered undignified in today's mentality. Death can be
caused by administration of a drug with the intention of ending life as well
as ending suffering. Such active interventions are chosen when there is no
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possibility of a cure and when the patient has expressed his desire not to
continue living.
For many others, the right to die with dignity implies the removal of
life support systems or the withdrawal of treatment from terminally ill
patients in order to allow the patient to succumb to the underlying disease.
This frees the person from the slavery of aggressive medical treatment,
which prolongs suffering.
There has been a debate over the reach of the term "euthanasia" . In
the past, that term has been divided into active and passive. Passive
euthanasia means to hasten the death of a patient by removing life support
equipment or stopping medical procedures or treatment. Active euthanasia
means to immediately cause death by the application of a lethal agent.
From the point of view of professional ethics, it is irrelevant whether the
life of the patient was taken by an active intervention or by omission of a
necessary treatment. Through both, death is brought about intentionally.
The definition of euthanasia must be understood as, by action or
omission, the deliberate ending of the life of a patient who is suffering or
has an incurable disease, and this has been requested by either the patient
or the famil y. I Here, omission is understood to be the privation of a
medical intervention that is considered valid and necessary for the patient
to live.
On the other hand, there is no euthanasia in the removal of
unnecessary life support, or in death caused by the "double effect" of drugs
that are given to relieve suffering but may also shorten life, or refraining
from medically futile treatment. There is no obligation to undergo or
prolong a treatment that is considered futile by the medical profession.
The practice of allowing death with palliative care interventions to relieve
the terminally ill patient's pain, suffering and other sy mptoms is accepted
as ethical and legal, provided the intention of the physician is to relieve
pain and other symptoms, and not to hasten death .2
Physicians are considered the logical candidates from whom to seek
help in dying since many of the terminally ill see help in dying as an
extension of relief from suffering and as a form of caring, consistent with
the profession .3 Furthermore, it is already being done in countries like
Holland. In addition, according to anonymous polls, 13 to 19% of
physicians in the United States have participated in physician-assisted
suicide. 4 Oregon has been the first state to legalize physician-assisted
suicide.
In the present reflection I am going to analyze the arguments in favor
of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide and consider a critical
response from the Catholic Christian perspective for each of them , taking
into account as well that there is also a rationale for the secular mind .
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Reasons Given in Favor of Euthanasia and
Physician-Assisted Suicide and Catholic Response
1. Poor quality of life. Those who advocate euthanasia and physicianassisted suicide argue that in some circumstances living is worse than
dying, that the pain and suffering caused by a terminal disease may make
life so agonizing and unbearable that death may seem "an act of humanity"
and physician-assisted suicide a way to die with dignity.5 The physician
would act under the principle of beneficence to relieve the pain and
suffering of terminally ill patients. For the dying patient, suffering may go
far beyond pain. This includes: progressive loss of activity, mobility and
freedom associated with increasi ng helplessness and dependence on
others; physical discomforts such as nausea, vomiting, inability to swallow
or to talk, incontinence and weakness ; fear of dying, loss of dignity ; and
dementia.6 Life loses all quality and meaning so that death is preferable.
Critical response: Quality of life issues are confused here with the
value that the quality of life has. Human life has an intrinsic value. 7 Good
health cannot give dignity to human life, since health does not have life in
itself, rather it participates in life. Health is a good that one can enjoy and
care for, but it is not an absolute good to which everything else must be
subordinated. Health is for the human being, but the human being is not for
health. The dignity of the person cannot be erased by illness. Rather, loss
of di gnity is imputed to the patient by reactions of caregivers and family to
the patient's plight or appearance. Furthermore, quality of life issues have
a strong subjective component. Very easily the health care professional
will substitute his or her quality of life standard for that of the patient.
Dying with dignity must not be understood as a right to active
euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide when one is enduring a poor
quality of life due to pain and suffering, rather it is a right to die in a
dignified environment, receiving care and affection from persons to whom
one is close, and the right not to prolong suffering with futile treatments.
Suffering is not only caused by pain, there are many circumstances that
cause suffering. The values, fears , and anxieties of the person must be
attended to when death is near.

2. Respect for the patient's autonomy. According to the defenders of
euthanasia, respect for autonomous persons demands recognition of their
right to decide how they will live their lives. This includes the dying
process. It is proposed that we have the right to avoid intolerable suffering
by exerting control over the way we die; we are free to take responsibility
for our own life, including our death. Every person has an individual level
of tolerance for suffering and therefore there is no objective measure of
when life is unbearable that can apply to everyone. Thi s is why it is
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necessary that the patient exercise his/her autonomy. Some authors believe
that there is a right to commit suicide and to have no unreasonable
restrictions placed on the means by which one can exercise this right to
suicide.8 States would not have the right to prevent a patient from the
freedom to take his/her life. Battin has argued that there is an unequally
distributed but fundamental right to suicide, which we have because it can
be constitutive of human dignity, at least in a negative sense, when life
becomes unbearable. 9 This is even more relevant if we consider that, with
adequate palliative care, there are cases in which it is not possible to avoid
the suffering. lo The patient's right to self-determination has been a most
central argument in favor of physician-assisted suicide. II Often it is
assumed, without argument, that this implies a patient's right to request
another agent to intervene so as to bring about his or her death. 12 A person
who is terminall y ill may not be able to exercise the option of suicide
because of mental or physical limitations. In a way, they are being
di scriminated against because of their disability, since able-bodied people
can exercise the option. It is also argued that future patients would be less
anxious if they know of the possibility of physician-assisted suicide.
Critical response: The terminally ill patient is in an extremely
vulnerable position, suffering from depression, anxiety, fear, dejection,
guilt, and diminished autonomy. Under these conditions, it is very difficult
to have a clear mind to make decisions and the patient may almost blindly
follow the suggestions of the physician. Asking for death does not
necessaril y reflect an enduring, voluntary wish, properl y reflected upon.
The patient may wish death because of deficiencies in medical attention,
such as not being able to alleviate pain, not because of a free decision .
Further, it is not the same to commit suicide as to aid in a suicide. The
latter is a form of homicide, even if the underlying reaso n is compassion.
The autonomy of the patient cannot oven-ide the physician 's autonomy. 13
The patient has no right to ask another person to help in suicide.
3. The principle of beneficence. The principle of beneficence, or
compassion for the suffering has been used as an argument in favor of
euthanasia. 14 In this way, euthanasia has been considered a virtuous act.
Nonabandonment of the patient has been part of the traditional care by
physicians. Physician-assisted suicide must be judged under thi s ethical
principle. I S Today, many terminally ill patients consider physicians the
logical ones to help them in dying since, for these patients, assisting death
is considered an extension of alleviating suffering and exercise of care,
consistent with the profession. 16
Critical response: The compassion talked about by the proponents
of euthanasia reflects a distorted view. True compassion does not eliminate
the sufferer, but seeks to relieve the cause of the suffering. 17 Otherwise, the
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life of the patient is devalued. Besides, compassion is a spiritual quality,
which means "suffering with," to be present to the sufferer, it is not a
principle or self-justifying reason. Choosing assisted suicide eliminates all
possible bonding with those who accompany one in the difficult moments
of death. Further, to bring about death by euthanasia is not within the
competence of the medical profession. Physician-assisted suicide is not
consistent with the doctor's pledge to heal and treat, is against the
traditional ethical codes (Hippocratic, World Health Association, AMA).
It will lead to a distrust in physicians. Accepting assisted suicide will
diminish the peoples ' trust in physicians.
Moreover, the health
professional also has an autonomy that must be respected and he/she
cannot be pressed to act against his/her professional values.
4. The positive experience of acceptance of euthanasia in Holland. The
experiment of euthanasia in Holland is regarded as successful by the
general public and the medical profession in that country, so that no
physician who follows the given guidelines can be penalized. These
guidelines are: the patient must be competent and ask voluntarily for death
after having been counseled, his/her suffering must be unbearable not
possible to ameliorate, the judgment of the physician with respect to
diagnosis and prognosis must be confirmed by another physician.
Critical response: The experience in the Netherlands has shown the
reality of the slippery slope. There have been successive steps in
relaxation of criteria: euthanasia has been extended to non-terminal
patients, minors, Down Syndrome, patients with mental suffering, severe
depression, dementia, incompetence "under certain conditions, and nonterminal AIDS patients. IS This evil reality exceeds the positive effect that
could be claimed for legalized euthanasia.19
5. Diminishing of the public stigma against suicide. The public stigma
against suicide is decreasing. In most jurisdictions, suicide is a legal act
and has been so for decades. Most suicides are seen as resulting from
temporary mental illness, usually depression,20 but the reason why
terminally ill patients desire to shorten the process of dying is to terminate
their suffering. This raises the concept of rational suicide.
Critical response: Suicide is still considered an evil in today's
society and when it is known that someone is attempting suicide, measures
are taken to prevent it. Data suggest that the interest of patients in
euthanasia in the majority of cases is due to depression or psychological
distress, rather than pain. This suggests that much of the debate about
euthanasia is misplaced, since it focu ses on pain and using euthanasia for
pain relief when, in fact, pain does not seem to be the primary motive. 21
Suffering of psychological origin can be relieved with adequate counseling
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and psychiatric intervention. With proper support, including pain relief,
psychological and spiritual therapy, and friendship, the patient can die in a
dignified way as a member of the human family, without any euthanasia.
No present legislation allows help in committing suicide for a person who
is going through a period of depression. Rather, his/her depression would
be treated. To legalize physician-assisted suicide would contribute to
desensitization toward killing throughout society. Though attempting
suicide has lately been decriminalized, the state's interest in preventing it,
including the penalization of those who aid the attempt, has not wavered.
No matter how ill a person , he is still among the living and therefore has
the right to live Y Moreover, because life does not belong completely to
us , we simply do not have a right to commit suicide. No one can say that
he/she has given life to himself/herself. Not all ultimate choices about
one's life qualify as protected rights.

6. The similarity between killing and letting die. The distinction
between "passive" and "active" euthanasia has been criticized for
depending on problematic conceptions of causation and on the belief that
the sheer difference between killing and letting die is morally irrelevant.
Discontinuing life support measures and active voluntary euthanasia are
similar from the patient's point of view in that the fundamental desire is for
an earlier and more comfortable death. They are similar morally in that
both are done with the intent of ending life. 23 It is argued that the intention
is morally irrelevant in the evaluation of the morality of the action . For
example, in the case of stopping feeding artificially a patient in coma,
clearly the intention is to end life, since the person would die of hunger. In
the case of discontinuing supportive measures and allowing the patient to
die after days or weeks of extreme discomfort, active euthanasia is
sometimes deemed morally preferable. 24 For some, discontinuing a
ventilator cannot be considered a refusal of treatment, rather it is a request
to be killed."S For Patrick Hopkins,26 there is no metaphysical, essential
and intrinsic moral difference between machines and body organs so that
omitting treatment is a form of killing in which we deprive the person of an
organ that can only function with the aid of a machine or technology. He
feels that we need to set aside our prejudices against the artificial and
extend the option of good killing (active euthanasia) to those who are
trapped by nature. If our society recognizes that life can be sufficiently
burdensome while on life-sustaining treatments, such as a respirator or
dialysis machine, and further that these interventions can be withdrawn or
withheld (what some call passive euthanasia), then it can be sufficiently
burdensome to justify active euthanasia.
Critical response: There is a special relationship between the
physician and the patient. An omission to act, if it results in harm, may
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bring legal liability. If a competent patient refuses to consent to treatment
or to continue treatment, the legal effect is that the physician is absolved of
his or her duty by the patient. Although the physician terminates treatment,
the subsequent death is caused by the underlying disease, which the
physician no longer has authority to treat. The physician is not killing the
patient but allowing him to die. Ordinarily no one is under any duty to help
a neighbor, such that omissions to act bring no liabilityY Voluntary
acceptance of a death that medical intervention can only postpone cannot
be forbidden.
What is forbidden is unlawful killing. Often in the dialogue, there is
confusion between passive euthanasia and euthanasia by omission. The
latter brings legal liability but the former does not since natural deaths are
not killing. Thus, they are neither illegal nor immoral, and do not confer
responsibility. It will prove helpful to avoid the term passive euthanasia,
while we can retain the idea of euthanasia by omission, which implies a
negligent act.
A conclusion about causation simply reflects a judgment about the
right place to assign responsibility. When a person turns off a lifesupporting respirator without authorization, it is clear that he/she is causing
the patient's death and is subject to liability, but when a physician follows
the patient's directions to disconnect a respirator, he has not acted
wrongfully. He has no duty to continue treatment against the patient's
wishes, even though his action is causally related to the patient's death.
Furthermore, the right to avoid treatment is based on the right to resist
physical invasions that are not proportionate to the cost to the patient, not
in the right to accelerate death, which does not exist.
Withdrawal or withholding treatment is accepted in such cases as:
continuation of mechanical ventilation after whole brain death, therapy in
cases of irreversible coma (except ordinary care), life support mechanisms
in cases of terminally ill patients, resuscitating techniques in cases
considered futile by the medical profession, medically futile therapies that
increase pain, and therapies clearly disproportionate in relation to human
costs and utility for the patient. 28
An illustration that intention has its place in moral life is that when the
person does not die after removal of the treatment, the person is left alive.
This is not satisfied by assisted suicide. It is one thing to desire death and
actively bring this about and another thing to desire death and allow it to
occur. It is one thing to respect the will of the patient to reject treatment
and another to take his life. It is not just a psychological difference, but
also a moral one. To kill is always a lesion of the principle of nonmaleficence, but to allow death is not, under certain conditions. To allow
someone to die of a disease for which we are not responsible and cannot
cure is to allow the disease to be the cause of the death. 29 The intention of
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allowing to die is compassion, not death , while the intention of active
euthanasia is death as a means for compassion. 30 It does not maintain the
di gnity of the patient to continue futile treatments when there are no
possibilities of cure. A futile treatment does not produce a benefit to the
patient, but a harm. 31 It is not the same to maintain life in someone who is
living as it is to as to prevent death in someone who is dying.
A treatment is considered futile if it does no more than maintain
uncon sciousness or if it does not permit an end to dependency on the
inte nsive care unit. Quantitatively, a physician can consider a treatment
futile when empirical data demonstrate less than 1% probability of benefit
to the patientY Life and death iss ues cannot be decided with absolute
certainty, simply because there is no strict and specific rel ation between the
etiology and the di sease. Our knowledge of an empirical reality is always
approximate, probable. We cannot ask the physician for absolute certitude
in hi s/her deci sion s. Therefore, it is necessary to establi sh a prudent limit
of error for life and death decisions. Since there is no absolute certainty, it
is the deci sion of the patient to continue with a futile treatment. For an act
of omission to be euthanasia, the treatment omitted or withdrawn must be
a useful one, not a futile one.

7. The principle of double effect is a form of active euthanasia.
Physicians are allowed to give increasing doses of narcotics when there is
severe pain. It is presumed they do thi s with the knowledge that these
drugs depress respiration and could hasten death. 33 It is argued that if the
death of the person who wishes to die is not an evil for himselflherself,
then the doctrine of double effect does not have relevance in allowing
voluntary euthanasia.
Critical response: Optimal palliative care could provide adequate
pain relieffor most tenninally ill patients. 3.J Inpatient hospice units provide
an example of providing supporti ve measures at the end of life, with
comfort care directed to the person as a whole. Legalizing physicianass isted suicide would divert attention from pain relief and palliative care.
The easy road for the health care professional is to be free from the
frustration, hostility and anguish that cause the "hopeless" cases. The issue
of hastening death with palliative care interventions for terminally ill
patients is accepted as ethical and legal provided the intention of the
physician is to relieve pain and other sy mptoms and not to hasten death .35
Physicians, though , must be careful not to introduce narcotics in a big
dosage all at once, without giving the patient time to develop tolerance. A
di sproportionate sedation can cause interruption of feedin g and hydration
of the patient, who can die of hunger or thirst while uncon scious or even of
an overdose. In such cases, euthanasia can be concealed. Ethically, the
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physician must look for the pain relief that will offer less risk to shorten life
and still relieve the patient from unnecessary suffering.

8. The duty of not imposing heavy burdens on those close to us. John
Hardwig has argued that when modern medicine allows us to survive far
longer than we can take care of ourselves, there is a duty or responsibility
to die, out of consideration for our loved ones not to impose crushing
burdens on them. 36 In a time when medical funding is restricted, it may not
be ethical to engage in extremely expensive treatment of terminally ill
people. David Thomasma argues that it could be ethical to ask for
physician-assisted suicide or active euthanasia because of love for close
relatives, consideling that in Christian doctrine there are instances in which
killing is justified and also considering that such a request could be
considered acceptance of the cross, or the acceptance of death as the
martyrs had done, since having been able to avoid death, they accepted it
instead, donating their lives for others. 37
Critical response: To allow physician-assisted suicide would have
an impact on other sufferers who are ill, aged, or weak. This will devalue
their lives and they may undergo assisted suicide under pressure. Further
pressure is exerted by economic constraints, but mentioning this to the
patient undermines the call to generosity of those who surround the patient,
who is suffering enough already with the disease. Terminally ill patients
would lose the bonds with those who accompany them in the last moments
of life, they would have to justify their decision to keep on living. To help
discover, through suffering, the meaning of the entirety of life can liberate
the patient from feelings of abandonment and desperation when facing
death .
Furthermore, the voluntary acceptance of death by Christ and the
martyrs can not be interpreted as equivalent to suicide. 38 As has been
pointed out by Engelhardt,39 Christ has taught us that life has as a goal
union with God and His cross is a way to offer His life to God. Suicide,
instead, is an act in which the person turns against himselflherself, wishing
death without pursuing union. The martyrs never accepted death under the
premise of refusing to be a burden to themselves or their loved ones. To
the contrary, they accepted with humility the indignity and suffering of
death because of a superior cause, the union with God. This has nothing to
do with active euthanasia or assisted suicide.
Ethical Reflection
Practically all religious traditions, including groups such as Christians,
Muslims, and Jews, consider life as a gift from God, to be given and taken
at the time of His choosing ; suicide can never be an option. Aristotle
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affirmed 40 that suicide is an unjust act and cannot be allowed, not because
it goes against the individual , but because it goes against the community.
Human life has value and dignity in itself because it is the life of a person.
Physical life is constitutive of the person and a condition for its existence,
is the fundamental value of the person and therefore cannot be valued, taking
as criteria minor and relative values, nor can be declared to the disposition
of others. Besides, Chlistians believe that God supports people in suffering
and therefore to actively end one's life would represent a lack of trust in
God 's promise. 41 Taking life usurps the prerogative that God has over each
one of our lives. Also, as Chlistians, we have an obligation to SUppOlt those
who are suffering and to maintain our belief that suffering brings us closer
to Christ, identifying us with Hi s cross and participating in redemption.
Part of the problem with much of the present debate on euthanasia is
that no value is given to suffering, although it could be an occasion for a
person to look deeply into hi s/her own existence, to look for reconciliation
and find a transcendental meaning to life. Nowadays people have very
little tolerance for pain , we are afraid of it. This fear is due to an excessive
preoccupation with the body and to technical progress . In these, thanks to
alleviation of pain by drugs and anesthesia, we are today much less
familiar with pain than our predecessors were. It has gotten to the point
that death is accepted more than pain. This rejection of suffering has led to
the social acceptance of euthanasia.
But suffering can lead to a spilitual experience and it is possible to
find meaning in life when there is no hope of cure. 42 Spirituality can fortify
a person who suffers and help him accept hi s condition. Finding meaning
to suffering gives sense to a suffering life that has little capacity for
relationships. Even considering that life can become unbearable, the final
matter is that life cannot be taken because suicide is not ethical.
The question can be raised as to whether believers have the right to
take these beliefs and impose them on the entire populations, including
secularists, atheists, and agnostics. I will argue that they do in this case,
si nce it is possible to find a rational solution. Both believers and nonbelievers agree with the common conception that life and death are given
to us. The only difference is that believers attribute this gift of life to God.
Not everything, then, is autonomous in the human being. We do not give
life to ourselves, we have received it from our parents. Therefore, we do
not have absolute dominion over our own lives and cannot take them.
This argument reinforces all the clitical arguments against euthanasia,
since the quality of life cannot have greater value than life itself. The
autonomy of the person cannot be absolute, true compassion cannot consist
in eliminating the sufferer, suffering cannot be enough argument to accept
suicide, to allow to die is in the context of accepting death as a part of life.
and to alleviate pain and suffering is to help life. To treat the body as if it
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were an object that could be freely destroyed vio lates the intrinsic dignity
of the person. We have the responsibility and the duty to take care of each
other until the natural end of our lives. We have received our lives, they are
not objects that we possess. Rather, we are responsible for what we do
with them. We are able to exercise options and it is this that makes us
responsible for our li ves.
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